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In Cambodia, the interactions between large-scale land investment and land titling 
gathered particular momentum in 2012–13, when the government initiated an 
unprecedented upland land titling programme in an attempt to address land tenure 
insecurity where large-scale land investment overlaps with land appropriated by 
peasants. This paper is based on a spatially explicit ethnography of land rights 
conducted in the Samlaut district of north-west Cambodia – a former Khmer Rouge 
resistance stronghold – in a context where the enclosures are both incomplete and 
entangled with post-war, socially embedded land tenure systems. We discuss how 
this new pattern of fragmentation affects the prevailing dynamics of agrarian 
change. We argue that it has introduced new forms of exclusion and a generalized 
perception of land tenure uncertainty that is managed by peasants through the 
actualization of hybrid land tenure arrangements borrowing from state rules and 
local consensus. In contrast with common expectations about land formalization, the 
process reinforces the patterns of social differentiation initiated by land rent capture 
practices of early migrants and pushes more vulnerable peasants into seeking wage 
labour and resorting to job migration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Large-scale land investments that come under the rubric of ‘land grabs’ are occurring to a significant extent 
and at a substantial pace in South-East Asia (Borras and Franco 2011), including Cambodia (LICADHO 
2014). They are becoming increasingly connected to land titling initiatives partly due to the growing spatial 
overlap but also to the political economic convergence of both processes (Diepart 2015; Dwyer 2015). Land 
(in)security lies at the core of this intersection; titling is seen as a tool to provide smallholder farmers with 
security of tenure that would protect them from dispossession by ‘land grabs’.  
The importance of securing peasant land rights in the context of large-, medium- or small-scale 
investment in farmland is strongly echoed in several international guidelines calling for more responsibility 
in large-scale agricultural investments (e.g. FAO, 2012). 
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From an agrarian justice perspective, it seems essential to provide smallholder farmers with land tenure 
security, particularly in countries with a large peasant population like Cambodia. However, the effect of titling 
on controlling large-scale land grabs does not necessarily conform to idealistic expectations. Land titling and 
the development of a market for land property rights is considered by many observers as unaffordable for 
cash-strapped farmers and is associated historically with the capture of the process by the local elites (De 
Schutter, 2011; So, 2009). Other authors emphasize the negative effect of titling: that it inevitably results in 
the absence of land titling in certain areas, which weakens security and reinforces inequalities in land access 
(Hirsch, 2011; Milne, 2013). 
In Cambodia the interactions between land grabs (large-scale land investment exemplified by so-
called economic land concessions (ELCs), or through illicit land acquisition by powerful figures such as 
military officers) and land titling gathered momentum in 2012-2013 when the government initiated an 
unprecedented upland land titling programme called Order 01 (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2012). This 
was an attempt to tackle conflict situations in which agro-industrial ELCs overlap with landholdings of 
traditional land users and migrant peasants (Diepart, 2015; Müller and Zülsdorf, 2013). 
How the intersection between ELCs and land titling re-shapes land tenure security and transforms 
land-based social relations and the actual development of agrarian systems, is the subject of this contribution. 
We are particularly interested in looking at areas where both processes are only partially implemented on the 
ground, either due to incomplete titling efforts or to incomplete implementation of agro-industrial operations 
on the concession land. This situation of incompleteness actually prevails across Cambodia and is not 
sufficiently addressed in current ‘land grab’ debates. 
Our organizing proposition is that the entanglement of locally embedded tenure regimes, i.e. post-war 
land appropriation under Khmer Rouge control, with incomplete large-scale state land concessions and 
incomplete titling, lead to new forms of fragmentation in rural territories, with the nature of land tenure 
[in]security distinct within each ‘fragment’. These transformations create spatially-differentiated land 
property dynamics that reshape pre-existing patterns of agrarian change. We argue that the incomplete nature 
of the private and state enclosures results in a widespread uncertainty in land tenure and further suggest that 
territorial fragmentation reinforces the pre-existing patterns of social differentiation. It formalizes the upfront 
land rent capture process operated by early migrants in the post-war land pioneer process and truncates the 
upward mobility of the others. Down the line, these transformations exacerbate the mobility of labour through 
wage and job-migration. 
The paper proceeds as follows: we first briefly present the context of recent land formalization 
processes in Cambodia and the fragmentation propelled by the intersection between large-scale land 
concessions and titling in Cambodia. We then conceptually frame the study at the intersection of land control 
and agrarian change by drawing on the notions of territorialization, land tenure security and social 
differentiation. Third, we present our methods and the case study we have investigated. Four, we present how 
the recent incomplete enclosure processes have intersected with post-war land distribution by the Khmer 
Rouge to produce the territorial fragmentation. Fifth, we show the relations between the plurality of 
institutional arrangements and the security of land tenure. Sixth, we then discuss how they affect pre-existing 
patterns of social differentiation and outline their effects in relation to agrarian change. 
THE CONTEXT OF RECENT LAND RIGHTS FORMALIZATION IN CAMBODIA 
In addition to establishing a moratorium on ELCs, Order 01 aims to tackle widespread conflicts resulting 
from apparent overlaps between land possessed by peasants and land earmarked for economic concessions. 
Land insecurity is tackled by granting farmers private property land titles where they cultivate, a process 
Dwyer (2015) calls the ‘formalization fix’. 
ELC lands are spatially very significant, covering over 2.1 million hectares in the uplands 
(LICADHO, 2014). The extensive disputes relating to these ELC lands resulted from a lack of recognition of 
traditional land use rights and the absence of coordination between the attribution of ELCs and massive 
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lowland-to-upland migration and associated land appropriation1. This has accelerated over the last 15 years 
as a response to growing problems in terms of land access and poverty in the central low-land rice plain 
(Diepart, Pilgrim, and Dulioust, 2014). These migratory movements are best understood in relation to 
historically rooted practice - commonly known as appropriation “by the plough” - that legitimizes land access 
by clearance and cultivation. As long as it does not infringe on the rights of others in the community, the 
cultivation of a piece of land for subsistence farming provides farmers with individual possession rights 
(paukeas in Khmer), which allow for use, harvest and exclusions. In this context, land tenure security 
predominantly works through recognition of possession rights legitimized by local authorities through local 
institutions (Olivier, 1954). However, the 2001 Land Law restricts legal possession to land occupied before 
2001. This has resulted in a huge population living on land that they appropriated after 2001 in respect of 
which they have virtually no land tenure security under the 2001 Land Law institutions (Diepart, 2015). 
There was an electoral objective behind Order 01 as the government seized the opportunity to calm 
the social unrest in the perspective of the then-imminent local and general elections. However, exclusion and 
violence deployed prior to and during the titling process have been widely reported (Beban and Work, 2016 
- forthcoming; Grimsditch and Schoenberger, 2015). 
The titling process that follows the so-called ‘leopard skin’ strategies under Order 01 foresees that 
plots cultivated by people prior to the granting of the ELCs are to be excised from the concession through 
titling, leaving the concession land spotted like a leopard skin. It has been presented by the government as a 
further step in the land reform to resolve and legalize unclear land occupation by users on state land (Im, 
2012), suggesting that large-scale concessions can co-exist with the pre-existing land use arrangements. 
A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO TERRITORIAL FRAGMENTATION 
The object studied in this contribution is the territory that we embed historically following the work of Elden 
(2010) who envisages it as an intertwined set of political economic, strategic and technologic issues. Territory, 
he argues, includes questions of access, distribution, property and competition (the political economic), 
questions of control and power in the enforcement of authority (the political strategic) but also questions of 
techniques for measuring land which are embedded in a legal apparatus (the political technologic). 
We propose to outline a conceptual framework that allows a better understanding of territorial 
fragmentation linking the dynamics of land control and agrarian change. We envisage processes of land 
control after Peluso and Lund (2011) as ‘strategies and practices that aim to fix, consolidate and legitimize 
access to land and its resources’ and pay particular attention to processes of territorialization. 
In a nutshell, our analytical approach leads us to first elicit patterns of central state territorialization 
at play through the imposition of land titling and land concessions that we conceptualize as [incomplete] 
enclosures. We then explore the institutional pluralism resulting from the overlap between these [incomplete] 
enclosures and local land tenure systems characterized by post-conflict control over land distribution and 
agrarian expansion by ex-Khmer Rouge local authorities. Last, we examine how these multi-layered patterns 
of land control affect the dynamics of social differentiation between peasants. 
  
                                                   
1 We refer to land appropriation in a widely accepted sense as a process through which peasants access, use 
and acquire exclusive benefit from a piece of land. It comprises a plurality of access such as inheritance, gifts, 
donations, land distribution, land clearing, purchase, etc. The notion of land appropriation incorporates a 
transfer of rights on the land. The word ‘rights’ is conceived here in social terms – an action over a resource 
that is seen as socially legitimate – rather than in legal terms (Pel et al., 2008). 
4  Jean-Christophe Diepart and Thol Sem 
State Territorialization Through [Incomplete] Enclosures 
We envisage land concession and land titling as instruments of state-driven land control that is being created 
through processes of territorialization, a term we use after Sack (1986) as ‘the attempt by an individual or 
group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting 
control over a geographic area’. 
In its exercise of territorialization, the state uses titling and concession as enclosures to facilitate the 
transformation of agrarian structure. These enclosures suppose a specific mode of land right formalization 
that is an essential element in the process of capitalist commodification of land and natural resources. Castree 
(2003) suggests that this is a dynamic process that physically delineates a fragment of land and associated 
resources (material boundary) and legally extracts it from its context (legal boundary). But as Akram-Lodhi 
posits, enclosure is about more than just land. It is also a pathway to ‘deepen capitalist social property 
relations by diminishing the relative power of peasants and workers in favour of dominant classes’ (Akram-
Lodhi, 2007). 
With titling, the state disciplines the management of territories; it demarcates, identifies what belongs 
to people and to the state and controls land use patterns (Biddulph, 2010; Scott, 1998). Land titling is the final 
stage in the individualization of private land property rights. It is a process of land right alienation supposed 
to bring land tenure security, raise land value, collateralize land for the uptake of credit and productivity 
improvement (de Soto, 2000) and can be the foundational step towards the development of a land property 
rights market supposed to allocate land between farmers in an effective and pro-poor way (Deininger, 2003). 
For more than a decade, however, there has been a growing set of critiques arguing that in the global south, 
and in Cambodia in particular, land titling has not met these expectations. It has not mechanically increased 
the security of tenure (Land Tenure and Development Technical Committee, 2015; So, 2009), it is associated 
with the capture of the process by local elites (De Schutter, 2011; Grimsditch, Kol, and Depika, 2012) and 
has not necessarily resulted in any gain in land productivity (Biddulph, 2010; Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 
2006). Additionally, the development of a land market opens the possibility of distress-sales by the poor in 
times of hardship, thus accelerating social differentiation (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006) and 
landlessness among the poor (Chan, Tep, and Acharya, 2001). 
In turn, large-scale land concessions have been instrumental in enabling the state to [re]exert control 
over peripheral areas and peoples (Wolford, Borras, Hall, Scoones, and White, 2013). In Cambodia, state land 
enclosure has been an important source of revenue to support warfare and post-war state building (Hibou, 
2004; Le Billon, 2000) and also, from the end of the nineties onwards, to enable the consolidation of the 
ruling-party’s power (Un and So, 2011). Large-scale land investment can be envisaged in a broad perspective 
as a public-private partnership between a state authority and an agro-industrial corporation for the purchase 
or lease of a designated area of land (Land Tenure and Development Technical Committee, 2010). Those who 
promote such land investment, usually emphasize the opportunity it offers to use investor interest and 
resources in ways that can increase smallholder productivity and improve local livelihoods. The premise is 
that so-called underutilized or vacant/idle land is consequently subjected to an effective and efficient 
production scheme through which smallholders, or out-growers, can benefit through various forms of 
contractual arrangements (Deininger et al., 2011). But in Cambodia, and elsewhere, large-scale land 
acquisitions are notorious for reshaping rural contexts in ways that lead to varying degrees of land 
dispossession for small-scale farmers and exacerbate the recourse to wage labour that does not usually 
compensate for the loss of resources that local people depend on (Gironde, Golay, Messerli, Peeters, and 
Schönweger, 2014). 
We suggest that both enclosures – large-scale land investment and land titling - are actually 
incomplete in time and space, a trait that adds complexities to the debate about land tenure security. First, the 
default of titling in certain areas reassigns untitled land as state property, which might further exacerbate risks 
of land grabs (Hirsch, 2011; Milne, 2013). Yet areas that have been excluded from titling are significant 
because the titling programme had to be conducted over a very short period with visible output, leaving sub-
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national authorities with a dilemma in deciding which areas should be included in the adjudication. Second, 
as White et al. (2012) suggest, large-scale land deals are often no more than an initial framework, which 
might, or might not, materialize in production and effective enclosure with dispossession of its previous users 
in a different time frame. Actually, this situation of incompleteness in concession operation, which prevails 
in most of Cambodia (Sperfeldt, Tek, and Chia-Lung Tai, 2012), is due partly to the highly speculative nature 
of these land deals, and partly to the fact that ELCs are often a tactic to circumvent the 2002 ban on logging: 
their clandestine aim is more to engage in timber logging than to conduct the agro-industrial activities 
specified in the agreement (Global Witness, 2007; Hibou, 2004; Milne, 2015).  
The incomplete nature of both types of enclosure obliges us to envisage a multiplicity of contexts of 
fragmentation according to the actual use, titling or implementation of the ELC. This zoning creates visible 
or invisible systemic edges in the territory - sensu Saskia Sassen (2014) - as they differentiate fragments of 
territory where the relations between peasants, their bio-physical and institutional milieu are distinct. The 
temporal dimension is also important in the territorial fragmentation, as the actual enclosure process is rather 
gradual on the ground with varying impacts on local livelihoods. 
Post-Conflict Territorialization and Institutional Pluralism in Land Tenure 
The enclosure process disembeds land from its bio-physical, cultural, social and institutional context – sensu 
Polanyi (1957) – and overwrites complex and multi-shaped land-based social relations and variegated forms 
in the management of land resources (Borras and Franco, 2012; De Schutter, 2011; Springer, 2013). The 
socially embedded institutions for land tenure in this region of Cambodia are shaped by post-conflict land 
control operated by old Khmer Rouge warlords through territorialization, a process that has triggered 
considerable in-migration and shaped the opening of the agricultural frontier. Diepart and Dupuis (2014) have 
argued that the tensions between Khmer Rouge and neoliberal modes of land control are central to 
contemporary territorial and state formation processes along the agricultural frontier in Northwest Cambodia. 
In a context of institutional pluralism, several competing claims, norms and legitimacy over land 
control and security of tenure are at play; the state-licensed formalization of land rights oriented towards the 
marketability of land and inalienable private property rights, and the local arrangements securing individual 
entitlements under local social rules and consensus under ex-warlords. Conceptually, we do not envisage 
these different forms of legitimacy over land as simply complementary but rather co-existent so that a single 
situation could be subject to, or be confronted by, more than one legal order or institutional mechanism 
(Merry, 1988; von Benda-Beckmann, 2002). However, as Pel et al. (2008) have argued, each set of norms is 
subject to its own internal contradictions, particularly in the context of Cambodian neo-patrimonial practises 
that empower and legitimize officials at various levels to authorize transactions over land under their 
jurisdiction.  
Institutional pluralism resulting from multi-layered patterns of territorialization engages state 
authorities (from national to local level) in different forms of relations with each other and with peasants. 
These relations are established between people in their attempts to secure their rights to land and a politico-
legal authority that can recognize their claim as legitimate. As Sikor and Lund have argued, a dialectic lies at 
the core of these relations. The process of supporting or complying with norms and rules regarding the 
allocation of land works to legitimize those with the authority to implement the rules (Sikor and Lund, 2009). 
In contrast, the process of evading or resisting these rules tends to discredit and weaken those with the 
authority to implement them. 
Land Control and Social Differentiation 
A central tenet of the study is to examine how multi-layered territorialization, mediated by a plurality of land 
tenure arrangements, affects the pre-existing patterns of agrarian change, which we envisage through social 
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differentiation. We approach social differentiation following Bernstein (2010) as the transformation of social 
relations of production between peasants, and with it, the differentiation of their capacity to reproduce their 
means of production and possibly accumulate assets and wealth. 
The social relations that structure production are a function of two mechanisms (Akram-Lodhi, 2005) 
that are shaped, at least partly, by the inclusions or the exclusions in land access resulting from 
territorialization processes. The first is the process of differentiation in [land] asset endowment, which works 
through market and non-market mechanisms between those with relatively larger and those with relatively 
limited quantities of productive assets. The second, which is contingent upon the differentiated control of 
productive assets, is the capacity to generate and control technical change and capture benefits from increased 
asset productivity. 
Social differentiation is usually indicated by the polarization of, at the one end, a labour-selling class 
of agrarian proletarians (or semi-proletarians), and at the other, an entrepreneurial labour-buying agrarian 
class (Akram-Lodhi, 2007; Bernstein, 2010). Hall et al. (2011) describe these processes as ‘intimate 
exclusions’ to underline the fact that they are at play form below between social intimates. These authors 
suggest that agrarian differentiation merits particular attention in the context of frontier areas where it is 
increasingly difficult for people who lose land through processes of exclusion in one location to move off and 
try in another. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
We illustrate these processes of territorial fragmentation on the basis of a case study conducted in Samlaut 
district (in Northwest Cambodia), specifically in and around the Rath Sambath rubber concession approved 
by the government in 2009 (Open Development Cambodia, 2014), with a specific focus on the villages of 
Chhak Rokar, Chamkar Chek and Ou Ta Trek. Chhak Rokar and Chamkar Chek are neighbouring villages 
located to the north of the rubber concession in a similar agro-ecological zone, but are separated by the titling 
efforts. Ou Ta Teak land is intertwined with concession land in the east and is located in an agro-ecological 
context that is very different to that of the other two villages (see Figure 1). 
This area was chosen because it complements previous research conducted in the neighbouring 
district where agrarian expansion occurs without the intervention of an economic land concession. The field 
research uses a variety of methods. We first historically contextualize the research site by reviewing a fund 
of literature and press reports that monitor this region of Cambodia. Indeed, it is significant as the source of 
a peasant uprising in 1967 and as the focus of Khmer Rouge resistance until the end of the nineties. We 
conducted a number of in-depth interviews (n=5) with land administration officials at national, provincial and 
district level who had been involved in the Order 01 land titling and/or who were familiar with the Rath 
Sambath concession. We also conducted interviews with two representatives from conservation NGOs active 
in the area. We developed a geo-reference database that was instrumental in performing a preliminary spatial 
analysis of land use and land tenure dynamics. 
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Figure 1. Study area 
 
 
This preliminary analysis was discussed with commune authorities (n=3) with the aim of identifying villages 
for field investigations. In this exercise, we wanted to choose villages that represented the diversity of 
intersections between land tenure regimes in and around the Rath Sambath ELC. Three villages with 
contrasting regimes were eventually selected (Figure 1). We then conducted short interviews with village 
leaders. 
During field work an ethnography of land rights was structured by three different types of discussions. 
First, in each village we conducted a focus group discussion with peasants – usually elders – who were 
knowledgeable about land distribution and appropriation from the early days of the village (after 1979) until 
now. We facilitated the mapping of land distribution and land appropriation and used the map as a basis to 
discuss issues of land security that had emerged before and after the implementation of the ELC and Order 
01 titling. We also conducted a household wealth ranking exercise to identify trends in socio-economic 
differentiation in the village. This exercise served to identify a diversity of families with distinct farming 
systems for in-depth interviews that we conducted in the three different villages (n=40) to elicit a fine-grained 
understanding about household trajectories, farm production decision-making mechanisms, the creation of 
value-added, dependence on credit, and family labour management including national and international 
labour migration. In addition, we conducted many unsolicited interviews with people whom we met 
incidentally during fieldwork (farmers, traders, middlemen, and representatives from village authorities). All 
field-based discussions and interviews were conducted in Khmer by the researchers in June and July 2014. 
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THE PRODUCTION OF FRAGMENTED TERRITORIES 
After the demise of Democratic Kampuchea in 19792, the Northwest region – the Samlaut district in particular 
- became the base for some Khmer Rouge (KR) resistance against government and Vietnamese forces, which 
resulted in violent conflicts that lasted until the late nineties. In 1996, a reintegration policy was initiated with 
the aim of providing KR warlords with the power to plan and supervise the distribution of land in this region 
to demobilized soldiers and in-migrant peasants (Gottesman, 2003). Land distribution and associated 
migration have opened the agricultural frontier and the emerging social order has crystalized processes of 
land control by old KR warlords (Diepart and Dupuis, 2014).  
The recourse to enclosures for land management and territorial development is embedded in this 
historical context of violence. And when they are coupled with the threat of force, initially employed by the 
military for territorial acquisition and control in warfare and later by agricultural entrepreneurs colluding with 
state bureaucracy actors, these enclosures have become institutionally deviant in the sense that force is 
legitimized by government institutions against private citizens and interests (Pilgrim, Ngin, and Diepart 
2012). 
Land Appropriation in Chhak Rokar and Chamkar Chek 
A first phase of land distribution took place in the chaos of the early eighties that followed the escape of 
members of the Khmer Rouge to a resistance base in the Northwest. In this region that remained under KR 
control, the rule was to distribute five hectares of forested land to each family, who could later clear and 
convert it to agricultural land. This early land distribution remained effective on the ground; people never lost 
access to the land they were allocated at that stage, even if, subsequently, the rampant conflict obliged them 
to move to safer locations. 
In Chhak Rokar and Chamkar Chek, the first group of migrants were closely related to the local KR 
military unit (angkapheap) who controlled the land distribution. They were a mix of not-yet-demobilized KR 
soldiers and people who had lived in the area before the war. The appropriation of better quality land in the 
village (better soil fertility and access to water) followed a logic of ‘first come, first served’ and thus these 
early migrants were at an advantage. These areas now constitute the central area of the village where main 
roads have been developed giving better access to market. This central area also offers better public 
infrastructure and forms a main transportation axis to the Thai border (Figure 1). The peasants who 
subsequently migrated to this area were usually related to the earlier migrants through family or acquaintance 
networks. They settled in the village and received land according to the same distribution rules but in areas 
increasingly located at the periphery of earlier settler landholdings (Figure 2). In addition to being located 
further from village centres and infrastructure, land appropriated by these subsequent migrants was of worse 
quality (more rocky, shallow and sandy soils). From 2001, appropriation of land was even conducted through 
sale, which also allowed rich outsiders to acquire large landholdings in the villages.  
The agrarian developments first expanded southward, largely inside what constitutes the present day 
Rath Sambat rubber concession (Figure 2), and then westwards inside the Samlaut Multiple Use Protected 
Area. Although this was established in 1993 it was not, at that early stage, under the effective control of 
officers from the Ministry of Environment who were theoretically charged with managing this initiative.  
Given the considerable tracts of land suitable for cultivation within this study area, the opening of the 
agricultural frontier has created incentives for migration as transforming forest to agricultural land is a very 
labour-demanding dynamic. However, all the peasants accepted the relationship between the local authority 
and the land access rules imposed by the Khmer Rouge elite; those were the rules of the game and none of 
                                                   
2 The name given to the country under the Khmer Rouge regime 1975-1979 
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our respondents said that these rules were contested. Land security was socially built within the relational 
process of land attribution and appropriation in a way that legitimated the land authority. 
 
Figure 2. Land appropriation and enclosures in and around the Rath Sambath rubber concession. Note: The 
numbers indicate the different fragments of territory that are described later in figure 3. 
 
Land Appropriation in Ou Ta Teak 
Ou Ta Teak village is located in another corner of the present-day Rath Sambath rubber concession 
(Figure 2). We separated it from the other two village as it differs significantly in terms of agro-ecology, land 
appropriation and enclosures. In this village, the initial land distribution was also implemented under the 
control of a local military unit (Angkapheap) in the early nineties, when Khmer and ethnic minority groups 
(Por, Jarai, and Kouy) came back from the refugee camps on the Thai border. The agricultural land located 
in the central area of the village was the first to be distributed, followed by the land in the surrounding hills. 
But the process was particularly complicated due to the massive presence of unexploded mines.  
A similar process of upfront land capture by the local elite has taken place that has allowed them to 
appropriate land that has the best access to water. The Por indigenous people moved back to the ground they 
had traditionally used for swidden agriculture, but which they had abandoned during the war. It is interesting 
to note that the Khmer people mimicked their indigenous neighbours by engaging in swidden agriculture in 
the surroundings hills. This land on the hill was distributed by the Angkapheap in plots of approximately 0.75 
to 1 ha in total area size depending on the labour capacity of the family. In 1993, the establishment of Phnom 
Samkos Wildlife Sanctuary (another Protected Area) considerably limited the expansion of swidden despite 
the continuing arrival of migrants seeking land suitable for swidden agriculture. To anticipate the land needs 
of generations to come, local authorities in Ou Ta Teak, in concert with authorities of other villages in Ta 
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Taok commune, decided in 1993 to allocate land located further north in a 700 meter-wide strip of land that 
follows a road in development (Figure 2). This is located inside the present-day Rath Sambath rubber 
concession. The land was attributed to families (1.4 ha per household) who could keep it in reserve until they 
were ready to cultivate. Around the years 1998 to 1999, some families were able to materialize their claims 
on those reserved lands (Figure 2). The operations had to start with an expansive demining campaign that 
peasants undertook themselves or by paying for private specialized services. Due to the absence of basic 
infrastructure in these new locations, nearly all peasants focused land activity - and had their main residence 
- in the old village, and only established a secondary shelter in these new locations.  
Rath Sambat Rubber Concession: the Making of an Incomplete Enclosure 
When the Rath Sambath rubber concession was assigned in 2009 to a company represented by a well-
connected Cambodian lady from Phnom Penh, the objective of the 70-year deal was to establish a rubber 
plantation on an area size of 5,200 ha. The land deal was established through sub-decree (Royal Government 
of Cambodia, 2009) the day immediately after a request was sent to the Prime Minister by the Minister of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF, 2009). As indicated above, the land was partly occupied and 
cultivated by people (Figure 2). Basic field visits to the site beforehand would have sufficed to make this clear 
– not to mention an environmental and social impact assessment required by the sub-decree on economic land 
concession (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2005) and the expropriation law (Royal Government of 
Cambodia, 2010). However, neither of these took place. The actual use of the land by local peasants was 
simply disregarded by the concessionaire, who declared during a discussion in 2009 with one of our 
respondents: ‘there is no-one on this land, this is a jungle of tigers and elephants’. Six months after the land 
deal was struck, a provincial working group was assigned to survey the area (Provincial Administration of 
Battambang, 2009). The report highlights the impacts the concession would have on people and their land, 
but does not specify the names of the people concerned, or the exact area affected. It has thus remained of 
little use in protecting peasants’ land rights. 
However, the company is not fully active in all of the concession areas: the updated aerial photographs 
reveal that the area where the company is currently working constitutes approximately 400 ha out of the 5,200 
ha allocated. According to our field respondents, the company has been primarily active in deforesting the 
area and in exporting the resulting timber to Battambang. Our respondents indicated that a local police chief, 
well known for his involvement in rosewood logging, was partnering the company in clearing the land. 
Further questions and concerns might also be raised by the fact that running a rubber plantation requires 
specific skills and knowledge - that the company does not necessarily have – and that it is a labour intensive 
activity. The deep resentment of the local population towards this concession has hindered the company in 
hiring local wage labour. In addition, the implementation has required that the area be demined, and this, too, 
has slowed the process of actually planting rubber trees. The absence of any possibility of poverty alleviation 
- that might have been an outcome of the provision of local wage-labour - is thus clear, and supports the 
argument made by Tania Li (2011) that large-scale land acquisition is unlikely to be directed to, or effective 
in, helping the poor. 
Our investigation suggested that the incomplete nature of agricultural operation on the economic 
concession land had exerted an impact on the local people that was spatially differentiated. In Chhak Rokar 
and Chamkar Chek (to the north), the mobilization of the people that arose when the company started to 
establish boundary markers sparked a protest that was locally organized behind a charismatic leader. This 
resulted in an oral agreement with the company that the people would be allowed to continue cultivating the 
land they had inside the concession, but that they would not be allowed to encroach further. But people have 
little trust in the company’s assurances, and the future remains uncertain to them. As the company is not 
currently active in the area, the situation for the farmers is fundamentally business-as-usual. Of importance, 
however, has been the encouragement from local authorities for farmers to plant as many trees as they can in 
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the area under cultivation (including inside the Rath Sambath rubber concession) to ensure that their territory 
is well marked if the company decides to start operations that are more widespread.  
Key contradictions are emerging between central and local state representatives in relation to an 
acceptance of this concession. These were echoed by a commune council representative: ‘They [upper level 
state authorities] say that we [the farmers] are encroaching on state land, I hear this all the time now. They 
always put the blame on us. But I want to ask who they think we are? Aren’t we the people of this land? Aren’t 
we the state people?’  
The establishment of the concession has had tangible effects on people in Ou Ta Teak, where it has 
resulted in physical eviction and encroachment on a large piece of land that had been the reserve of peasants. 
These events sparked a profound revolt. The people’s request was to allocate a 250 meter-wide strip of land 
in the area to be available to them as a reserve. Our respondent said that their request was categorically 
rejected by the company who argued that ‘if the land is not cultivated, it does not belong to anyone but us’.  
The clearing of the land and the implementation of the rubber plantation was conducted by 
representatives from the military, who had been hired locally. The threat of violence had been used to 
intimidate people and, given the asymmetry of power in place, people had no choice but to drop their claim 
on these lands. This had forced a movement back to the old village locations (Figure 2). 
The Variable Geography of Land Titling  
In 2012, a land titling campaign – a nationwide initiative - was implemented in the area by a group of students 
(wearing military uniforms) and cadastral officers. In Samlaut, general implementation guidelines were taught 
to the team during a few days of training. The primary focus of the campaign in Samlaut was to title cultivated 
land in economic or forest concessions that was primarily in conflict zones, or in areas designated for forest 
rehabilitation (this was reported by a respondent from the district cadastral office). But in view of time and 
resource constraints, the decision was made to focus primarily on agricultural land adjacent to road corridors 
(this information was given by a respondent from the district hall). For apparently the same reasons, the team 
did not work in one single commune of the district (Samlaut commune). Titling took place in Chamkar Chek 
(Sung commune) but not in Chhak Rokar (Samlaut commune) although they share similar agro-ecological 
conditions and development problems. 
During the implementation of the titling initiative, there was a disparity in the application of the rules 
across different areas; the results on the ground were contingent on a number of factors. The difference in 
skills meant that some teams were able to map and demarcate much more land than others, thus leaving a 
relatively smaller area untitled. Another aspect that resulted in disparities revolved around the capacity and 
willingness of the titling team to understand the actual history of land occupation of the plot in order to 
differentiate between a real forest and a fallow area with just a few years of regrowth. Also, the anticipation 
of the land needs of the next generation was a concern for some students, but not for all. During the titling 
process, staff working for the Rath Sambath rubber concession were active in moving around, directing the 
students as to where they should and should not focus their efforts. We also heard reports of illicit land 
acquisition, usually involving outsiders who had managed (with the help of locals) to clear a piece of land 
and build a house - literally overnight – in order to take advantage of the cheap titling services on offer and 
to assert land rights. 
Thus, although this titling process aimed to provide security to people whose land ownership was in 
dispute, we suggest that it has principally reinforced the position of the concession in the area. First, titling 
has mostly take place outside the concession area and a very limited proportion of land inside was actually 
titled (Figure 2). Second, only the land under cultivation was titled even if people had a larger claim on the 
land that was not currently being cultivated. The section of the plot inside the concession that did not receive 
any title was de facto reassigned as state land which has strengthened the legitimacy of the concession to 
claim it even if rubber trees have not yet been planted on it.  
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FRAGMENTED TERRITORIES AND PEASANTS’ LAND TENURE (IN)SECURITY 
In this section, we examine how these new patterns of territorial fragmentation affect the land security and 
the perception of it by the peasants.  
Ambivalent Attitude Towards Land Titling 
Land possession rights that farmers have enjoyed since the land distribution and appropriation that followed 
the KR reintegration are based on local forms of bonds between the farmers and the local authority. The 
compliance with local norms and rules regarding the allocation of land works to legitimize the authorities 
who are charged with implementing them. Land tenure security is actually constitutive of this social order, of 
the underlying power networks, and of the relational control over land use exercised by the authorities jointly 
with the other farmers. The titling brings central state actors - through the multi-level national cadastral 
administration - into the daily affairs of the village and creates new forms of accountability between the 
farmers and the authorities that challenge the pre-existing forms of social control over land and land rights in 
the Constitution and the 2001 land law. This shift is particularly problematic as the titling is a compulsory 
process that requires additional transaction costs for people in the process of acquiring the title. This was 
reported to us as an issue that was widespread.  
In areas within Samlaut where the land security of people is not significantly challenged, titling is not 
well received because of the significant land security people have enjoyed locally in the context of local post-
war land sovereignties. The absence of clear motivation for people to acquire a title, given the fact that 
payment of unofficial transaction costs is compulsory, means that people tend to reject the new land right 
formalization processes. This mistrust was articulated by one of our respondents who is a village 
representative: ‘… but now we know how the titling goes and we know what we need to give to actually get 
the title, so next time they come, we will tell them: “no thank you, we don’t need your titling”’. 
People reject titling because it is associated with a distant and corrupt administration that is perceived 
not to be working for the common interest. People actually do not reject the title as a form of security but they 
do challenge the institutional and political context in which this titling is conducted.  
However, in situations where there is more conflict, such as the one around the Rath Sambath rubber 
concession in Ou Ta Teak village, the process of titling is better accepted and the title is considered as an 
administrative document that can contribute to land security. However, people consider it as supplemental in 
that it comes on top of a recognition by local authorities that already exists. This common view was clearly 
voiced by a village chief who told us: ‘I was asked by the higher level [province, district cadastral 
administration] to collect all titles and make them available to the company so they could see clearly where 
their land was excised. But I discussed this with my people in the village and we all agreed not to give them 
the titles because we are afraid they will sell our land. So I just act as if I am deaf.’ 
This attitude reveals the ambivalent attitude of people towards titles: they accept and welcome the 
document as a legal proof of possession but reject the institutions that allocate the title to them. In a wider 
perspective, this ambivalence to titling reflects a tension between the central and local state that is historically 
rooted in the Northwest region of Cambodia. Rungswasdisab (1995) argued that, since the eighteenth century, 
Northwestern territories have become a refuge zone for political dissidents opposed to Phnom Penh power. 
Diepart and Dupuis (2014) have also argued that the fragmentation of state authority has persisted until today 
between ex-KR local land sovereigns and the neo-liberal state. 
Perceptions of Land Tenure Security in a Fragmented Territorial Mosaic 
The process resulting from the overlap of incomplete enclosures and land appropriation by the peasants 
creates a spatially-explicit mosaic of land fragments (Figure 2). During the interviews, the participants 
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produced this mosaic on a map in order to facilitate a discussion about the perception of peasants in respect 
of land (in)security. Particularly revealing was the fact that these distinct fragments – which were, on the 
surface, confusing - made a lot of sense to our respondents; they were able to navigate conceptually and 
articulate very well their perceptions about the risks and uncertainties within each of the fragments (Figure 
3). 
A first observation is that peasants’ perceptions of land tenure security do not constitute an absolute 
judgement. It is rather a relative notion resulting from a comparative calculus between different land 
fragments. For instance, those who have land outside the rubber concession in Chhak Rokar evaluate their 
security according to their fellows in Chamkar Chek where titling took place, i.e. the security they have lost 
by not having their land titled (). Another important aspect is that people continue to refer to the village 
chief to assess their land security, even if the land is, on the one hand, titled, or, on the other, particularly at 
risk (). A third key observation is that titles improve the perception of security, but the feeling of 
insecurity remains significant, even in respect of land located outside the concession (,  and ). Titling 
has addressed a limited number of cases where insecurity prevailed, but in a wider perspective it has 
exacerbated a feeling of tenure insecurity and uncertainty. First, the titling and the land dynamics revolving 
around the rubber concession have stimulated the development of wealth-biased land markets and the 
manoeuvres of entrepreneurs and investors from inside and outside the community. The fear of losing 
additional land in the future is clearly perceptible. Second, the titling was targeted to areas adjacent to the 
main road where pioneer migrants first became established. The titling has actually consolidated their land 
assets at the expense of peasant families who are more peripheral, spatially and socially. Third, the process 
of titling, presented as a tool against land grabs, has reduced the discussion about land security between 
private ownership and state control over land. This has undermined the legitimacy of past efforts by some 
members of the communities to promote a common property regime. 
In this context of uncertainty and institutional pluralism, the perception of land security, held by 
peasants, derives from two legitimizing processes of land control: the cadastre anchored in the law, and the 
local land sovereignty. But a discussion that polarizes the two forms of legitimacy on land control is actually 
misleading because peasants are not in a dichotomy. They do not gain security either from the land title or 
from the local authority. They rather navigate between both worlds and by so doing they create new and 
hybrid forms of land tenure security. What lies at the core of perceptions of land security is the actual trust in 
the relations established between the peasants and the institutions that provide them with a recognition of 
their land rights. In such a fragmented and transformative environment the perception of land security is 
highly contingent on local rules and is thus highly variable and dynamic. 
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Figure 3. Respondents’ appreciation of land security status resulting from titling and economic land 
concessions. Note: the numbers included in this figure refer to fragments of territory identified in figure 2 
 
 
FRAGMENTED TERRITORIES AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION OF THE PEASANTRY 
We now turn to an exploration of how the new forms of land security emerging from the territorial 
fragmentation affect the pre-existing patterns of social differentiation among the peasantry and whether they 
indicate new patterns of agrarian change. 
Land Tenure Uncertainty and Agrarian Development in Chhak Rokar and Chamkar Chek 
In the early eighties, the first phase of forest pioneering led to the formation of mostly self-subsistence-
oriented annual cropping systems. At the end of the nineties, these systems became increasingly 
commercialized. The main cropping succession is corn (early rainy season) followed by soybean. Corn was 
extensively cultivated in the early years as the pioneer crop using practices that have negatively affected the 
chemical and physical properties of the soil (Belfield, Martin, and Scott, 2013). After 6-7 years of continued 
cultivation, the yield of annual crops decreases sharply and peasants have to compensate through the use of 
chemical fertilizers to maintain yields. A consequence of this is a decline in their gross margin. This adds to 
the problems imposed by uncertain weather patterns which render yield and returns unpredictable.  
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Except for rice, all annual crops are destined for the market. Products are sold entirely to middlemen 
working in commodity chains piloted by agro-industrial groups (e.g. CP from Thailand) and entrepreneurs. 
All the peasants we met told us: ‘The market is on the middleman’s lips’, indicating that they have no power 
to negotiate with the commercial intermediaries. To engage in this input-demanding agriculture (seeds, 
fertilizers, pesticides, etc.), farmers are obliged to take short-term credit from different banks, and from formal 
or informal micro-credit institutions working in the district, and from family or wealthy neighbours. Access 
to credit is not problematic but is expensive (up to 5 per cent per month for short-term credit). In the context 
of these highly commercialized and risky agricultural activities, most peasants are trapped in a cycle of debt 
and reimbursement. 
Besides land preparation, all agricultural operations are carried out manually by family labour but 
also with external labour recruited either as cash-paid casual wage labour (5 USD/day) or within labour 
exchange groups. Because the demand for agricultural wage-labour is high across the district, the mobility of 
labour is significant. A central element in labour management is the growing importance of cross-border job 
migration through which Cambodian workers seize wage labour opportunities in Thailand (5 to 12 USD/day). 
Job-migration has become part and parcel of labour allocation decision-making, particularly to compensate 
for crop failure. 
In this environment, peasants are trying constantly to secure a viable income portfolio. To address the 
declining profitability of annual cash crops (corn/soya bean), some are turning to cassava – a crop more 
resistant to climate irregularities. However, not all farmers can afford this shift as the upfront costs per hectare 
are more significant for cassava than they are for corn - 590 and 426 USD/ha, respectively, according to our 
survey in 2014. In addition, cassava is a 10-12 month crop so farmers need the capacity to buffer the absence 
of cash return during this long period before harvest. In 2004, some farmers started to transform their annual 
cropping systems into perennial crop systems that can be ranked into three investment/profitability classes 
(high value: pepper and rubber; medium value: fruit trees such as longan and durian; and low value: cashew). 
These crops generate a much higher profit (15.300 USD/ha/year for a 10-year production period in the case 
of pepper), but they remain largely unaffordable for farmers as they require considerable upfront cash 
investment (e.g. pepper requires an investment of 10,027 USD/ha for the first 3 years of cultivation) as well 
as the capacity to buffer an absence of income for several years. The capacity of peasants to move from annual 
to small-scale perennial crop plantation is arguably a key factor in crystalizing the economic differentiation 
process in this region of Samlaut. 
In this context, a marked and rapid social and economic differentiation process has unfolded which is 
driven by three key factors which are internal to the peasant population: the type of land access which depends 
on the period of migration (i.e., when the migrants came, or returned, to the region); the availability of a 
labour force to engage in forest clearing and expansion of agricultural landholdings; and the availability of 
capital or savings to fund the conversion of an annual crop into small-scale perennial crop plantation (Figure 
4). 
The earlier migrants, who were usually close to local authority members, received proportionally 
more land than later migrants, the soil was of better quality and it was located in the village area (thereafter 
called the centre), outside of the present-day Rath Sambath rubber concession. These advantages were 
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Figure 4. Processes of social differentiation between peasants in Chhak Rokar and Chamkar Chek. Note: The 
numbers refer to the groups of households in Chhak Rokar and Chamkar Chek discussed in the text 
 
 
As such, the early phase of the land appropriation was a land rent capture process playing in favour of the 
early migrants who were KR soldiers and people who had lived there before the war. Among early migrants, 
those with limited labour capacity have not extended their landholding into peripheral areas and have 
maintained an annual crop in the centre with a mix of corn/soya beans and cassava cropping systems (group 
1, approximately 20 per cent of the population). Given the decline in productivity and profitability of annual 
crops, they are dependent on wage labour and job-migration. Some landholdings of these early migrants have 
decreased through distress sales (usually related to health issues); the reliance of these people on off-farm 
work and job migration is even more pronounced (group 2, approximately 10 per cent of the population). The 
very late migrants, who could not purchase land, rely exclusively on wage labour and migration to make their 
living (group 3, approximately 5 per cent of the population). The early migrants with a relative abundance of 
labour have been able to expand their landholding into more peripheral areas to establish medium-value 
(mostly fruit trees) perennial crop plantations and possibly engage in cassava production (group 4, 
approximately 30 per cent of population). Later migrants, dependent on land purchase but with limited 
financial capacity, have been able to access land only in peripheral areas where they engage in a mix of annual 
crops and low value perennial plantations (cashew) (group 5, approximately 30 per cent of the population). 
Those among the early migrants or the new rich migrants with access to savings or non-farm income have 
been able to pursue the conversion of annual cash crops or to upgrade their existing fruit tree plantations into 
high value perennial crop plantations such as rubber or pepper (group 6 approximately 5 per cent of the 
population).  
As the processes of differentiation have unfolded along the opening of the agricultural frontier, they 
have developed a significant spatial expression. We use this association to discuss the impact the enclosures 
have had on peasants’ decision-making processes as they relate to agricultural production and labour 
allocation.  
The peasants of group 6, the better-off, are sheltered from land exclusion and insecurity as their 
landholdings are located mostly outside the rubber concession. However, all of the peasants in groups 4 and 
5 said that the prevailing uncertainty in terms of land tenure had restrained them from upgrading their 
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cropping systems to higher value perennial crop plantations; the investment had become too risky for them 
without financial security. While their landholding size started, or will decrease through inheritance, these 
families will become more dependent on wage labour and job migration, including cross-border displacement 
to Thailand. This process is clearly perceptible. However, both enclosures have little effect on the other groups 
(1, 2, 3) as their landholdings are located mostly outside the company concession area. However, their 
dependence on wage labour and job-migration is reinforced as land atomization proceeds through land 
markets and also through inheritance.  
In summary, land uncertainty that has emerged from the territorial fragmentation, influences – not 
determines - the pre-existing processes of social differentiation between peasants. It has blocked the upward 
mobility for a majority of peasants and has reinforced the necessity of moving away from the village through 
wage labour and job-migration.  
Land Exclusion and Agrarian Development in Ou Ta Teak 
The agro-ecological context of Ou Ta Teak is strikingly different. The land is of much poorer quality (more 
shallow, sandy and drought prone) and the landholding per household is much smaller. The land located 
around the village is used for rice cultivation and as orchard, mostly for self-subsistence. On the hill, the 
swidden system consists typically of one plot (0.75-1 ha) under cultivation for 1 to 2 years and then left fallow 
for 4 to 5 consecutive years. Swidden plots are located at a distance that varies from 20 minutes to 4 hours 
walk from the village. Swidden land produces rice with some corn for feeding livestock. Food insecurity is a 
major issue. Although commercialization is limited, access to credit is important to enable people to invest in 
livestock and for survival during lean periods. Labour mobility is prevalent as people migrate to seek wage 
labour in the district and in Thailand. Given the narrow base of agricultural production, wage labour has a 
relatively greater importance in the peasant income portfolio in this region. 
The very early migrants, who were closely related to the local military unit, received land next to 
farming water sources, close to current village centres. As in the case of Chhak Rokar and Chamkar Chek, 
these early migrants received paddies in the lowland area of the district which has sheltered them from food 
insecurity. Likewise, the land rent capture operated by the early migrants has been significant in the 
differentiation processes (Figure 5).  
In the second half of the nineties, two factors put the swidden agriculture system under pressure. The 
expansion of land for swidden agriculture was challenged by the establishment of the Protected Area – in 
which swidden agriculture is supposedly forbidden - and was further complicated by the massive presence of 
unexploded mines. The arrival of subsequent migrants forced the people to reduce the fallow period in their 
swidden calendar, thus limiting the natural reproduction of fertility which is essential in a swidden agriculture 
system. The peasants took advantage of land and resources in the village to progressively abandon swidden 
cultivation and engage in permanent cropping activities. Those with a relative abundance of labour (group 1, 
approximately 5 per cent of the population) could materialize their claims on the reserved land that had been 
allocated to them, while others could not (group 2, approximately 10 per cent of the population). The peasants 
in this latter group are relatively more dependent on wage labour and job-migration, even if these strategies 
are adopted more as an opportunity to maximize the labour capacity of the family than as a means of survival. 
 
  
18  Jean-Christophe Diepart and Thol Sem 
Figure 5. Processes of social differentiation between peasants in Ou Ta Teak. Note: The numbers refer to the 
groups of households in Ou Ta Teak discussed in the text 
 
 
The later migrant households (group 3, approximately 45 per cent of the population) who did not have 
the necessary connections with local authorities were allocated swidden land, but not land around the village, 
so their farming options are more limited. The absence of any public services in this new area means that they 
have little incentive and lack the back-up necessary to cease swidden agriculture and reallocate their efforts 
to the reserved land. To them, wage labour and job-migration are central elements of their livelihood system. 
As in other locations, the landholdings of some of these later migrants have decreased through distress sales 
(related to health issues or to the entrepreneurial pressure of wealthier farmers, officials or newcomers to 
acquire or enlarge land holdings), thus rendering the dependence on off-farm work and job migration even 
more acute (group 4, approximately 25 per cent of the population). The very late migrants, who could not 
purchase land, rely exclusively on wage labour and migration to make their living (group 5, approximately 
15 per cent of the population).  
As in the case of Chhak Rokar and Chamkar Chek, there is a spatially explicit relationship between 
the different trajectories of households and the way their landholdings have been affected by the enclosures. 
The landholdings of group 1 have been largely protected by titling because this group could materialize their 
claim to the reserved land. This was possible because of privileged access to agricultural land in the village 
in the early phase of land distribution.  
The situation of groups 3 and 4 is significantly different. Their exclusion from land stems from the 
fact that they have not been able to materialize their claim to reserved land, so they have not received any 
titles and, as a consequence, have lost all claim rights on this land. These households are now trapped in a 
very fragile agriculture system and are dependent on the Ministry of Environment official arbitration in 
respect of their request to extend the area available for swidden agriculture inside the Protected Area. To 
them, the impact of the enclosure has primarily exacerbated the need to pursue wage labour and job-migration, 
particularly among the young for whom the land was reserved. 
The exclusionary nature of the enclosures is more apparent in Ou Ta Teak than in Chhak Rokar and 
Chamkar Chek. However, although its influence in respect of the differentiation among peasants is the result 
of different mechanisms, it nevertheless manifests the same patterns of change. It has given an advantage to 
those early migrants who were in a favourable position during the land distribution and were able to 
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materialize their claim to land inside the present-day rubber concession. For a majority of households who 
did not have that chance, the enclosures are reinforcing a reliance on wage labour and job migration that was 
already significant in the village. The enclosures have thus further marginalized those who were more 
vulnerable. 
CONCLUSION: TERRITORIAL FRAGMENTATION AND AGRARIAN CHANGE 
In Cambodia, the interactions between large-scale land investment and land titling – perceived as enclosures 
- gathered particular momentum in 2012-2013 when the government initiated an unprecedented upland land 
titling program called Order 01. This constituted an attempt to address land tenure insecurity in a context 
where large-scale land investment overlapped with land appropriated by peasants. This article has reviewed 
how the intersections between both types of enclosure interact with locally embedded land tenure systems to 
produce new forms of fragmentation in the territories that re-shape pre-existing land-based social relations 
and dynamics of agrarian systems. The villages studied here represents an area where land titling has 
intersected with rubber concessions established in 2009 in the Samlaut district – a former Khmer Rouge 
resistance stronghold in Northwest Cambodia.  
 
In this context, we have conceived the fragmentation of those territories as a result of multi-layered 
processes of territorialization that bring in central and local state authorities, the population and the various 
generations of migrants. Central state interventions are embedded in landscapes where post-conflict land 
distribution to demobilized soldiers and in-migrant peasants was mostly determined by KR warlords. 
Alongside the agricultural pioneering progression, the emerging social order has crystalized on processes of 
land control exercised by these KR warlords. Central state territorialization efforts through land concessions 
and titling are incomplete across space and time due to the speculative nature of the large-scale investments 
and short-term political motivation of the titling process. 
These multi-layered processes of territorialization have resulted in a plurality of institutional 
arrangements and legitimacies over land tenure security: one exercised by the central state through the 
cadastral administration and the current exercise of the law, and the second by local state authorities through 
social consensus and the recognition of actual land appropriation and use. But a contradiction lies at the core 
of this institutional pluralism: large-scale land concessions and titling, used by the central state to regain 
control over peripheral regions where it has been historically weak, have actually threatened the legitimacy 
of the local state that has gained and exercised control through land distribution and recognition of peasant 
land rights. So, eventually, this conflict has reinforced antagonism between central and local state authorities 
over territorial control. 
These interventions have not only introduced new forms of inclusion and exclusion in land access, 
but also, and above all, they have induced a widespread perception of insecurity and uncertainty about land 
rights. This uncertainty is based on the fact that both types of enclosure are incomplete in their 
implementation. It is also a result of the dynamic of land commoditization, which has stimulated the 
development of wealth-biased land markets and the related manoeuvres of entrepreneurs and investors active 
in the surrounding area. 
We suggest, however, that peasants are not in a dichotomy “customary versus statutory” land rights 
and have internalized these contradictions in very pragmatic ways. They do not rely either on formal or 
informal arrangements, but rather navigate between both worlds and, in so doing, they create new and hybrid 
forms of land tenure security. The perception of land tenure security is obviously situated in a system with 
objective economic, social and institutional constraints. But it is also produced through the trust engendered 
in the relations established between the peasants and the institutions that recognize their rights. This is highly 
contingent on how local consensus interacts with central state rules. The hybrid nature of these new land 
tenure arrangements is expressed in the ambivalent attitude of peasants towards titling: while they accept and 
welcome the title as a legal proof of possession, at the same time they mistrust and reject the institutions that 
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allocate the title to them. The result of this process is that titling serves to strengthen the local-level land 
authority. 
The institutional pluralism and the ways peasants have addressed it have reinforced the pre-existing 
patterns of social differentiation between peasants that crystallized in the capacity of some peasants to control 
the transformation of annual cropping systems into small-scale perennial crop plantations or in the capacity 
to control the movement out of swidden agriculture. In all cases, these social differentiation patterns are driven 
by land control, either through capture of land rent by early migrants in the eighties or through land purchase 
by some new rich migrants. The inclusion into land formalization processes has benefited those who were 
already in an upward social mobility trajectory. In contrast, land exclusion and growing uncertainty of tenure 
have blocked the upward mobility of those who are more vulnerable and who are already dependent on wage 
labour and job-migration.  
Down the line, current transformations exacerbate labour mobility through an increased compulsion 
for the semi-proletarian peasants to seek wage labour and to pursue job-related migration including cross-
border to Thailand. And the institutionalization of off-farm labour tends to reinforce the land control by the 
local elite.  
This movement away from land, associated with the search for wage labour and job-migration, and 
which results from land exclusion and uncertainty about land tenure, can be seen as an expression of peasant 
household’s agency in responding to rural poverty. We argue that this movement forms the basis on which 
we can describe future agrarian development in this area. Labour mobility and migration in particular seem 
driven largely by land formalization processes, and, in a wider perspective, by agrarian dynamics. But perhaps 
equally important are questions relating to the role that this migration plays in terms of land tenure 
arrangements and agrarian dynamics. We suggest that future research questions should be framed around this 
dialectic interrogation.  
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